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Long: Locking the Boardroom Door

LOCKING THE BOARDROOM DOOR: WHAT CAN
GEORGIA COURTS LEARN FROM RECENT
DELAWARE POISON PILL DECISIONS?
Alan M. Long
INTRODUCTION
Public corporations have always been plagued by the threat of
hostile takeovers. 1 To curb such market volatility and preserve
company leadership, directors have turned to certain defense
mechanisms—perhaps the most notable being shareholder rights
plans called “poison pills.” 2 These shareholder rights plans are
flexible, easily adopted, and highly effective in deterring
acquisitions, tender offers, and even proxy contests. 3 Moreover,
nearly every state has validated the use of poison pills, following the
lead of the nation’s corporate hub—Delaware. 4 However, the
Delaware Court of Chancery recently drafted an opinion that perhaps
 J.D. Candidate 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my wife,
Ashley for her unwavering love and support and for keeping me sane throughout the publication of this
note and each day of law school. I would also like to thank my mother, father, and sister, each for
continuing to inspire me and push me toward my goals. In addition, I would like to thank Professor
Anne Tucker whose advice influenced the development of this topic, and whose feedback polished the
final draft, as well as Professor Robert Weber for his invaluable suggestions.
1. See David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest:
Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405, 405 (1993); Recent Case, Corporate Law—Takeover
Defenses—Northern District of Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision of Poison Pill—
Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997), 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1626, 1626 (1998) [hereinafter Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision] (“Over the past
fifteen years, the poison pill has become one of the most widely used takeover defenses.”).
2. E.g., William B. Shearer III, Comment, Poison Pills: Are Dead Hand Pills Dead in Georgia?, 50
MERCER L. REV. 809, 809 (1999); Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy
Contests: When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 506 (1993); see also discussion
infra Part I.A.
3. See infra note 23 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part I.2–3.
4. Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381, 403 (2002)
(“The legality of the poison pill is well-established [as] the courts in Delaware and many other states
have clearly upheld the poison pill . . . .”); id. at 403 n.150 (“There is now no doubt as to the legality of
the poison-pill rights plans. The ‘flip-in’ feature of the plan was held, in some early cases, to violate
state corporate law. These rulings, however, have now been overruled, either judicially or by legislation
explicitly authorizing the flip-in.”) (citing 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS § 6.03[4], at 6–59 (2001)).
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extended this validity too far.5 The court upheld a unique poison pill
with a 10% acquisition trigger that was enacted specifically in
anticipation of a proxy contest and strategically designed to restrain
only the ability of activist investors to purchase outstanding stock.6
Such director advocacy may lead down a slippery slope and raises
the question of whether other states will continue to follow
Delaware’s poison pill jurisprudence—particularly Georgia, which
has diverged from Delaware corporate law in the past.7
This Note addresses that question. First, Part I offers a general
overview of poison pills, as well as an account of their legal
development in Delaware and Georgia.8 Next, Part II discusses Third
Point LLC v. Ruprecht9—a recent Delaware Court of Chancery case
that could have a significant impact on corporate takeover law. 10
Further, Part II analyzes whether, if faced with a similar fact pattern,
Georgia courts would follow the Court of Chancery’s lead.11 Finally,
Part III proposes that the court in Third Point went too far in its
holding.12 Particularly, the Delaware Court of Chancery opened the
door for threatened boardrooms to enact unique poison pills with
exceedingly low triggers in the interest of protecting their positions
as incumbent directors rather than promoting the interests of the
corporation’s shareholders.13 As such, courts, shareholders, and states
like Georgia, which have become lost in an idea of boardroom
protectionism, should deviate from Delaware jurisprudence and limit
the use of such defense mechanisms.14

5. See generally Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2014); see also discussion infra Part III.
6. See generally Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029.
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
8. See infra Part I.A–B.1.
9. See generally Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.D.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF POISON PILLS AND THEIR ENFORCEABILITY
A. Poison Pills Generally
The term “poison pill” was coined to describe controversial,
defensive measures “adopted . . . in response to takeover attempts or
in advance of possible takeover attempts”15 that, when triggered, are
“poisonous to the raider.”16
Company directors implement poison pills through a shareholder
rights plan.17 When a board of directors elects to use a poison pill as
a defensive measure, its members vote to create a preferred share
plan. 18 After approval, the plan is typically “recorded as a board
resolution or in the company bylaws” and becomes effective
immediately. 19 The plan entitles each share of common stock to a
“dividend of one right”; accordingly, a right attaches to each
individual share and the two become inseparable. 20 In turn, these
rights become exercisable upon the occurrence of a predetermined
triggering event—generally a potential merger or acquisition, tender
offer, or the purchase of a certain percentage of the company’s
stock.21 “Once triggered, the [r]ights . . . detach from the shares and
entitle all of the target company’s shareholders . . . to acquire
securities at a discount.” 22 The securities that stakeholders may
15. Suzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 423 (1987).
16. 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE: MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS § 5.01 [A] (7th ed. 2012).
17. E.g., Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 423.
18. Shearer, supra note 2, at 812; see also Lucas O. Harsh, Note, Dead Hand Poison Pills: Will
Georgia Corporations Continue to Issue A Lethal Dose?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 665, 667–68 (2000)
(noting that a board typically “implements a shareholder rights plan without a shareholder vote”).
19. Shearer, supra note 2, at 812.
20. William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179, 184 (2003) (“These rights are initially ‘stapled’ to the common stock, in the
sense that they can only be transferred with the common stock, and are not immediately exercisable on
issue.”); Patrick J. Thompson, Note, Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or Gavels?, 42 VAND. L. REV.
173, 176 (1989) (noting that poison pills “are implemented through the issuance of a pro rata dividend
of ‘purchase rights’ to stockholders”).
21. E.g., Velasco, supra note 4, at 382. Acquiring twenty percent of a company’s stock will typically
trigger a rights plan; however, “[t]rigger levels vary . . . with some [being] as low as 10 percent.” Harsh,
supra note 18, at 667–68. Moreover, if ownership is threatened, a board can call an emergency meeting
to implement a new defensive measure or lower an existing triggering percentage to curb the threat. Id.
at 668.
22. Velasco, supra note 4, at 382; accord FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.01 [A]
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purchase depend on the type of right exercised.23 Yet, no matter the
right exercised, the result can be devastating to a hostile bidder.24
1. Poison Pill Variations
Basic poison pills can be broken down into five categories: flipover, flip-in, back-end, convertible preferred stock, and voting
provisions.25 Perhaps the most common poison pill category in rights
plans are “flip-in” provisions, which allow current shareholders,
other than the hostile bidder, to purchase newly issued stock at a
discounted rate.26 This is effective because the surge in ownership,
with the bidder precluded from purchasing the new stock, dilutes the
acquirer’s ownership. 27 “Flip-over” provisions are also common.
These provisions, often triggered by mergers, entitle rights holders to
(describing how each right detaches from its share and becomes exercisable upon the occurrence of a
triggering event).
23. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 181–87 (detailing the five types of poison pills that “have been
introduced since the early 1980s”); see also discussion infra Part I.A.1; discussion infra note 25 and
accompanying text.
24. Compare Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills,
3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 209 (2005) (“The poison pill is the most potent of antitakeover defenses.”),
with Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 426 (“Although poison pills may effectively deter certain
inadequate or otherwise undesirable offers, management and boards of directors must recognize that the
adoption of poison pills is neither risk free nor guaranteed effective.”), and Carney & Silverstein, supra
note 20, at 183 (asserting that most rights plans are less effective at deterring hostile bidders than many
believe, in part because only a fraction of the initial investment will be lost and “[o]nce the pill’s
effectiveness ends, the illness is free to resume its course”).
25. This Note focuses on flip-over and flip-in provisions. However, Suzanne Dawson and her coauthors provide a brief overview of the other three variations:
(iii) Back-end provisions entitling stockholders, except Acquiring Persons, to
receive stock and/or debt of the issuer and/or cash generally valued (together with
stock retained by the issuer’s stockholders, if not required to be tendered to the
issuer) at a premium over market for the issuer’s stock.
(iv) Convertible preferred stock provisions entitling stockholders, except
Acquiring Persons, to voting stock in the Acquiring Person as part of any
business combination and to redeem their preferred stock for cash payments from
the issuer if there is no business combination.
(v) Voting provisions involving the issuance of stock with supervoting rights not
available to an Acquiring Person.
Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 424. For an in-depth discussion of all five variations, see generally
Thompson, supra note 20, at 181–87.
26. E.g., Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 428; FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.01
[B][1] (“Today, the prevalent version of the pill . . . is the standard ‘flip-in/flip-over’ stockholder rights
plan.”). Typically, after an acquirer accumulates the specified percentage of stock, every other
shareholder is entitled to purchase additional voting stock at 50 percent of its market price. Id.
27. Harsh, supra note 18, at 668.
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purchase the acquirer’s stock at a substantial discount—typically at
50%.28 Flip-over provisions can significantly diminish an acquirer’s
capital assets because of this discount.29
In effect, flip-in and flip-over provisions serve as formidable
deterrents.30 Indeed, when either provision is triggered, “shareholders
will find that the rights are valuable and exercise them.”31 As a result,
the acquisition becomes exponentially more costly. 32 Therefore,
bidders are greatly discouraged from “accumulating the trigger level
through purchase, tender, or the formation of formal voting
agreements with other shareholders.”33
2. Overcoming Poison Pills
The only way around a poison pill is to have it removed, and most
are retractable.34 With this in mind, there are three recognized ways
to remove a poison pill: (1) negotiate with the target company to
retract the pill,35 (2) appeal to the court by asserting that company
28. Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 427. Dawson and her colleagues offer a helpful illustration:
[A]ssuming an exercise price of $150, the standard . . . flip-over poison pill plan
would require that, in order for the issuer to consummate a merger into an
Acquiring Person, the merger agreement must provide that the rights holders can
purchase $300 worth of the Acquiring Person’s common stock for $150.
Id.
29. Thomas, supra note 2, at 512.
30. It is important to note that these two provisions are commonly used in conjunction; after a flip-in
provision event, if the company engages in any merger negotiations or a substantial sale of its assets, a
flip-over provision will trigger and allow every stockholder except the acquirer to purchase “the most
senior voting securities” at fifty percent of market price. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at
§ 5.01 [B][1]. Of course, the flip-in provision is generally so effective that the flip-over is superfluous.
Id. (observing that a flip-in provision’s effects have become so unacceptable to hostile bidders that only
one has ever been triggered).
31. Thomas, supra note 2, at 512; accord Velasco, supra note 4, at 394, n.88 (observing that “once
the rights become exercisable, it becomes irrational to refuse to exercise them, since a shareholder
would be subjecting herself to the same economic poison facing the hostile acquiror”).
32. Thomas, supra note 2, at 512.
33. Harsh, supra note 18, at 668; accord Velasco, supra note 4, at 383 (“The poison pill derives its
effectiveness from this deterrence value—the incumbent management can remain in power because the
hostile bidder cannot afford to trigger the poison pill.”).
34. E.g., Shearer, supra note 2, at 812. Removing a poison pill is technically known as redemption.
Id. “Once the pill is redeemed, the rights can no longer affect the stock because they are no longer
exercisable.” Id. Also, it is important to note that rights plans are only redeemable by the board of
directors. Id.
35. Velasco, supra note 4, at 383. “[T]his is little more than a phantom option; if a friendly
transaction were feasible, a hostile bid would not have been necessary.” Id. To be sure, copacetic
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leadership has breached its fiduciary duty, 36 or (3) wage a proxy
contest to displace the incumbent board so that new directors may
remove the pill.37 A proxy contest, however, is generally “the only
real option available to most hostile bidders” and warrants further
discussion.38
A proxy contest is a fight for control of a company. More
specifically, it is a direct appeal to voting shareholders governed by
SEC regulations. 39 The purpose of the proxy contest is to provide
shareholders with enough information about the dissident investors
and surrounding context so that they can vote for leadership that best
represents the company’s interests.40 Despite their popularity in the
1950s and 1960s, however, proxy contests became sparse moving
into the final quarter of the twentieth century.41 Then, beginning in
the early 1990s in response to the growing number of companies that
adopted antitakeover provisions, proxy contests reemerged as a tool
for activist shareholders eager to remove unwanted executives.42 As a
result, corporate executives scrambled for a way to defend their
positions.

takeovers are usually cheaper for the purchaser. Id. at 383 n.14. As such, hostile takeovers are only
pursued where the bidder’s efforts have been hindered or are expected to be. Id.
36. Id. at 383; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
37. Velasco, supra note 4, at 383.
38. Id. at 384; Dawson et al., supra note 15, at 432 (identifying an “[i]ncreased likelihood of proxy
contests” as a potential risk of poison pill implementation).
39. Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69
MICH. L. REV. 421, 421 & n.1 (1971). Those rules are codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a. Id. at 421 n.1.
For an in-depth summary of those rules, as well as the methods of waging a proxy contest, see
FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 10.02.
40. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 421 (describing the purpose of such “corporate combat” as supplying
shareholders with enough information about each side to make an intelligent decision).
41. Thomas, supra note 2, at 508. During that time, the tender offer’s popularity grew, and it
eclipsed the proxy contest as the preferred method of changing corporate leadership. Id. That is to say,
due to uncertainty caused by electoral propaganda, shareholders became more willing to sell their shares
to discordant investors than to show their support at the ballot box. See id.
42. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 1, at 405. Indeed, “in 1987, more than 90% of Fortune 500
firms had antitakeover provisions in their charters.” Id. While poison pills have become widespread,
however, “[c]orporate America has [also] witnessed an increase in the number of proxy contests and
consent solicitations in recent years.” FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 10.01 (illustrating this
statement with empirical charts and data).
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3. Dead Hand Provisions
Though basic poison pills are useful for preventing hostile
takeovers, historically, when faced with a proxy contest, they did
little to ensure a company’s board members retained their positions.43
Thus, boards began adopting continuing director provisions to stay in
power. 44 These provisions, commonly referred to as “dead hand
provisions,” restrict the ability to redeem rights under a share plan,
essentially the poison pill, by only permitting the old board to do so
and not a new board of directors.45 Therefore, even if a new board
assumes power, its predecessors can activate the pill, diluting the
recently acquired holdings and making the displacement infeasible or
impossible. 46 This gives the board formidable leverage when
negotiating, often allowing it to fend off proxy fights.47 Indeed, dead
hand provisions have evolved into powerful and controversial
weapons, becoming perhaps the only “absolute ‘show stoppers’ in the
takeover market.”48

43. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 [B] (explaining that, because standard
poison pills do not bar a proxy contest, the acquiror can obtain control of the board and exercise its
redemption power). It should be noted, however, that basic poison pill varieties can be useful leverage
for an incumbent board in the negotiations preceding a proxy contest. See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,
No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (noting that where a target
company anticipated a proxy contest, executive advisors described poison pills as “[e]ffective device[s]
to ensure Board involvement in the timing and outcome of a takeover bid or creeping accumulation of
control”) (second alteration added). Because proxy contests are time-consuming and expensive,
dissident shareholders inhibited from hostile acquisition by a rights plan, may be more willing to
negotiate a deal before the contest date. Id. at 9–10, 14; Velasco, supra note 4, at 384.
44. Harsh, supra note 18, at 673–74.
45. Id. Delayed redemption provisions, also known as “no hand provisions,” work in essentially the
same way, the only difference being that new board members are prohibited from affecting rights plans
for a set term, during which time the original board is free to exercise the rights. Shearer, supra note 2,
at 811.
46. Shearer, supra note 2, at 816 (describing how a dead hand provision would prevent a newly
formed board from exercising the redemption right).
47. Thomas, supra note 2, at 508; see also Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281,
1283, 1289–90 (Del. 1998) (illustrating how a continuing director feature can thwart a tender offer and
proxy contest, leaving legal remedies as the only available option for a hostile bidder).
48. Harsh, supra note 18, at 675; cf. FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 (advocating
that while poison pills may be deterrents, they are not a target corporation’s panacea).
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B. The Development of Poison Pills in the Law
The poison pill has played a dynamic role in the progression of
corporate takeover jurisprudence “[s]ince making its legal debut in
1985 . . . .”49 During that year, the poison pill made an appearance in
two Delaware cases: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 50 and
Moran v. Household International, Inc. 51 In Unocal, the Delaware
Supreme Court addressed whether boards of directors faced with
takeover threats should be protected under the business judgment rule
by introducing a standard of review.52 Specifically, the court laid out
what became a two-prong test: (1) “a reasonableness test, which is
satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed,”53 and (2) a “proportionality test, which is
satisfied by a demonstration that the board of directors’ defensive
response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”54 If the court
is convinced both prongs are satisfied, the business judgment rule
applies, and the court will presume the board’s actions are valid.
Five months after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court went
further and validated poison pills as “legitimate exercise[s] of
business judgment.”55 In Moran v. Household International, Inc., the
49. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 27 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d
sub nom. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
50. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985).
51. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
52. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953. In Unocal, the board of directors rejected Mesa’s tender offer for
sixty-four million shares at forty percent below market price. Id. at 949–50. In sum, the court concluded
that Unocal’s board was faced with a “threat it reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate
enterprise,” so “its action [was] entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule[.]” Id. at 953,
958.
53. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *16 (Del. Ch. May
2, 2014). This prong “is essentially a process-based review” that can be satisfied “by demonstrating
[both] good faith and reasonable investigation.” Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48,
92 (Del. Ch. 2011); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990); see
also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
54. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *16. This prong consists of its own two-part test: First, were
the board’s defensive measures “draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive[?]” Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995). If the court answers no, it must then determine
whether the actions taken were “within a range of reasonable responses to the threat.” Id. Also, it is
important to note that the board of directors bears the burden of proof during both prongs of the Unocal
standard. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
55. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348.
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court upheld a rights plan that contained a flip-over provision
triggered after either the announcement of a tender offer for 30% of
corporate shares or in response to an individual entity or group
acquiring 20% of corporate shares. 56 Two disgruntled investors
attempted to abrogate the plan, alleging abuse of discretion. 57 The
court, however, concluded that the board had acted within its
fiduciary authority when adopting the plan even though the board
enacted the pill absent an immediate threat.58 The court also found
“the inherent powers of the Board conferred by 8 Del.C. § 141(a),
concerning the management of the corporation’s ‘business and
affairs’[,] . . . provid[ed] the Board additional authority upon which
to enact the Rights Plan.” 59 Moreover, in applying the Unocal
standard, the court determined that the board’s decision benefited
from the business judgment rule.60
The Delaware Supreme Court has stood firmly behind its earlier
decisions, repeatedly affirming the Moran holding and reiterating
that instituting poison pills is a legitimate exercise of a board’s
discretionary power. 61 However, Delaware courts have refused to
validate several directorial responses to threats of proxy contests,62
including dead hand and no hand provisions, which confine the
authority to retract the poison pill to the incumbent board members.63
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1349.
58. Id. at 1350, 1353.
59. Id. at 1353.
60. Id. at 1357.
61. See, e.g., Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 780 A.2d 245, 250–51 (Del. 2001). In that case, “[t]he
court recognized that many of the claims were not ‘precisely controlled by stare decisis,’ but reasoned
that ‘[t]o recognize [the] validity of . . . [such] claim[s] would emasculate the basic holding of Moran,
both as to this case and in futuro, that directors of a Delaware corporation may adopt a rights plan
unilaterally.’” Velasco, supra note 4, at 395 (citing Account, 780 A.2d at 249). See also Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1391 (Del. 1995); Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1990) (explicitly rejecting “a narrow and rigid construction of Unocal”); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (upholding a back-end
provision).
62. See, e.g., Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1998). For example, the
Chancery held that directors cannot delay shareholder meetings to buy more time to solicit votes nor
increase the board’s size to preserve control because such actions are not in the stockholders’ interests.
Id. at 1186; Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1208 (Del. Ch. 1987).
63. See generally Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998); see also
Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1186 (striking down a dead hand poison pill). For a more detailed discussion of
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Notably, in Quick Turn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 64 the
Delaware Supreme Court quashed a delayed redemption provision
that prohibited new directors from redeeming plan rights for six
months.65 While the Chancery found that the provision failed under
the Unocal test as an unreasonable response to a perceived threat,66
even more significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the
provision was against fundamental tenants of corporate law.67
1. Poison Pills in Georgia
Less than a year before Delaware’s judiciary invalidated dead hand
and no hand provisions, the Northern District of Georgia ruled in
favor of such defense mechanisms in 1997.68 In Invacare Corp. v.
Healthdyne Technologies, Inc., 69 Invacare sought a preliminary
injunction to nullify Healthdyne’s shareholder rights plan. 70 In
addition, Invacare proposed a bylaw that, if adopted, would compel
Healthdyne’s board to rescind the plan’s continuing director
provision. 71 However, the court upheld the continuing director
dead hand and no hand poison pills, see supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
64. Quickturn Design, 721 A.2d at 1281.
65. Id. at 1287; see also discussion supra note 43.
66. Quickturn Design, 721 A.2d at 1290.
67. Id. at 1291–92.
One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of
directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a
corporation. Section 141(a) requires that any limitation on the board’s authority
be set out in the certificate of incorporation. The Quickturn certificate of
incorporation contains no provision purporting to limit the authority of the board
in any way. The Delayed Redemption Provision, however, would prevent a newly
elected board of directors from completely discharging its fundamental
management duties to the corporation and its stockholders for six months . . . .
[Indeed, the provision] restricts the board’s power in an area of fundamental
importance to the shareholders—negotiating a possible sale of the corporation.
Id.
68. See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1579. The provision “require[d] that any redemption or amendment of the rights plan be
approved by one or more directors who were members of the Board prior to the adoption of the rights
plan, or who were subsequently elected to the Board with the recommendation and approval of the other
continuing directors.” Id. Thus, “if Healthdyne’s shareholders vote[d] . . . to replace the incumbent
directors with Invacare’s slate of directors, the new Board of Directors could not redeem the rights plan
because they would not be ‘continuing directors.’” Id.
71. Id.
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feature and found that the proposed bylaw violated Georgia corporate
law because it “would infringe upon the board’s [sole] discretion,”
which is statutorily prescribed and broad enough to encompass “the
authority to include [] continuing directors provisions . . . .”72 In fact,
the court lauded dead hand provisions, declaring that “the concept of
continuing directors is an integral part of a takeover defense and is
not contrary to public policy in Georgia.”73
In the wake of Delaware’s Quick Turn opinion, critics questioned
the Northern District’s decision to bestow upon directors such broad
discretion in adopting dead hand and no hand provisions.74 Yet, in
2000, Georgia amended its share options statute not to follow
Delaware but to cement its own approach to rights plans.75 Indeed,
O.C.G.A. § 12-2-624, “contrary to the Delaware authority, permit[s]
limitations on the ability of newly elected directors to withdraw or
change [shareholder] plan[s][;]” 76 albeit now, such limitations may
only remain in effect for 180 days from a director’s election.77
II. A MODERN POISON PILL EVOLUTION
More recently, poison pills have reemerged as a focal point of
debate following the decision in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht 78
where Delaware’s Court of Chancery upheld a new poison pill
variation that specifically discriminates against activist investors. 79
The decision is a hallmark in Delaware jurisprudence that will
72. Id. at 1582 (referencing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(c), which “gives the directors of Georgia
corporations the sole discretion to determine the terms and conditions of a shareholders rights plan”).
73. Id. at 1581. To support its conclusion that dead hand provisions are consistent with Georgia
public policy, the court also leaned on the use of “continuing directors” in two other state statutes. Id. at
1580–81 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1111, 14-2-1133 (1994)).
74. See, e.g., Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision, supra note 1, at 1631 (“At a
minimum, given the de facto interference with the shareholder franchise posed by continuing director
provisions and the Georgia legislature’s express desire to conform to Delaware law, the court should
have applied Delaware’s Blasius standard and required Healthdyne to show a ‘compelling justification’
for its infringement upon shareholder voting rights.”); Harsh, supra note 18, at 685–86.
75. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2,
2014).
79. Id. at *26–27; see also description of the poison pill infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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undoubtedly trickle down from the corporate hub and have farreaching effects on American corporate law.80
A. The Facts of Third Point
In the fall of 2013, Sotheby’s81 realized that Third Point LLC,82
working with two other activist hedge funds, had acquired
approximately nineteen percent of its outstanding stock.83 Sotheby’s
anticipated that the investors intended to replace members of its
board with their own representatives.84 Therefore, to gain leverage
before an inevitable proxy contest, Sotheby’s board adopted a
discriminatory rights plan. 85 The poison pill had a relatively new,
80. It is well known that states often look to Delaware when dealing with matters of corporate law.
Historically, this convention of imitation has steered many states’ assessment of poison pills. Velasco,
supra note 4, at 400. As a result, many pills have been upheld through reasoning that mimics Moran and
Unocal. See, e.g., Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845, 849–50 (D. Minn. 1986),
aff’d in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying the two-part Unocal test to
determine that the board’s decision to keep a rights plan in place “was clearly a reasonable response to
the hostile bid, which the Board . . . concluded was inadequate from a financial point of view”); A.
Copeland Enters., Inc. v. Guste, 706 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (“The validity of the poison
pill . . . can be viewed in two contexts: its validity at the time of adoption and its continued validity in
light of events subsequent to adoption.”). Moreover, several state legislatures have even codified
Delaware’s common law validation, authorizing the use of poison pills in their statutory scheme. See
FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.06 [B][2] (listing thirty-four state statutes authorizing
boards of directors to use poison pills).
81. Sotheby’s is the “oldest auction house in the world” and is a Delaware corporation publicly
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *2. In particular,
Sotheby’s specializes in selling fine art. Id. at *3.
82. Third Point LLC is an activist hedge fund firm managing roughly $14.5 billion in assets and is
known for reshaping the “business policies or capital structure of the companies it invests in.” Id. at *2.
83. Id. at *9. When the case was heard, Third Point controlled 9.62 percent of outstanding shares
while the other two acquirers, Trian and Marcato, held about 3 percent and 6.61 percent respectively. Id.
at *4, *12. Further, “Third Point held derivative positions that, if exercised, would increase [their
cumulative ownership] to over 20%.” Id. at *7.
84. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *7–9. Ruprecht predicted on September 4:
We are going to be the target of a proxy fight with activist shareholders. The
motivation for that fight is only peripherally about returning capital. It is about
being on Sotheby’s Board. . . .
....
[T]his is about power, and political gamesmanship with shareholders,
not about capital structure. In the event we do not act, my view is that a proxy
fight is much harder to win, and a slate of 3–4 new directors would displace
current directors.
Id. at *7–8.
85. Id. at *8–11. In a press release, the board claimed that the plan was “intended to protect
Sotheby’s and its shareholders from efforts to obtain control that are inconsistent with the best interests
of the Company and its shareholders.” Id. at *10. However, Ruprecht believed that the board had always
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two-tiered structure designed to defend against activist
shareholders.86 Specifically, the plan defined a 10% threshold for all
stockholder purchases, except for passive investors 87 who could
acquire up to 20% ownership.88 In addition, the pill contained a oneyear term and “qualifying offer” exception.89
Over the first quarter of 2014, after Third Point formally
announced its plan to “run a slate” of three directors at Sotheby’s
annual meeting, the companies negotiated “earnest[ly] in [an] attempt
to avoid a proxy contest.” 90 Nevertheless, the two failed to reach
amicable terms.91 Then, when Sotheby’s denied Third Point’s request
for a waiver from the plan to acquire 20% ownership, Third Point
and its CEO, Daniel Loeb, filed suit.92
B. The Vice Chancellor’s Analysis
In the context of Third Point’s request for a preliminary injunction,
the primary issues for the court were (1) whether the rights plan and
been in Third Point’s “crosshairs,” and in an email he wrote, “[o]ur job is to be compelling with
investors. We will have a big fight re the board composition next summer. Loeb wants to control our
board. . . . He’s a scumbag.” Id. at *8, *10.
86. Id. at *26–27.
87. Passive investors are those whose beneficial ownership is between 5 and 20% of a class of
outstanding registered securities who have not acquired or held those securities for the purpose or effect
of changing or influencing control of the issuing company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015).
88. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *10. More specifically, the adopted plan had a two-tier
structure where “those who report . . . pursuant to Schedule 13G may acquire up to a 20% interest in
Sotheby’s . . . [while] [a]ll other stockholders, including those who report their ownership pursuant to
Schedule 13D . . . are limited to a 10% stake in the Company before triggering the . . . ’poison pill.’” Id.
at *10. It is important to realize, however, that
“[a] person is eligible to file a Schedule 13G only if, among other things, they
have ‘not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect of, changing
or influencing the control of the issuer, or in connection with or as a participant in
any transaction having that purpose or effect’ and they own less than 20% of the
issuer’s securities.”
Id. (citing C.F.R. § 240.12d-1(c)).
89. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *10. The pill would automatically expire in one year unless
prolonged by a stockholder vote. Id. Further, the qualifying offer exception delineated that “the Rights
Plan [would] not apply to an ‘any-and-all’ shares offer for the Company that cashes out all Sotheby’s
stockholders and gives them at least 100 days to consider the offer.” Id.
90. Id. at *11.
91. Id. at *12–13.
92. Id. at *13–14. For an account of Mr. Loeb’s experience, as well as an interesting criticism of his
activist tactics see William D. Cohan, Little Big Man, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2013,
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2013/12/dan-loeb-cuba-car-accident.
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waiver refusal were a disproportionate response to the threat posed
by Third Point, (2) whether Sotheby’s gained an impermissible
advantage in the upcoming proxy contest, and (3) whether Sotheby’s
breached its fiduciary duties in adopting and enforcing the rights
plan.93 Vice Chancellor Parsons answered all three questions in the
negative.94
1. A Reasonable Reaction—Applying the Unocal Standard
To assess the board’s actions, the Vice Chancellor utilized the twoprong Unocal test, ultimately holding that both the poison pill’s
adoption and subsequent refusal to grant Third Point a waiver were
reasonable.95
a. Adopting the Pill
Applying the first prong, the Vice Chancellor concluded the board
likely reached an objectively reasonable determination that Third
Point’s acquisition of shares was a threat to the company, and,
accordingly, the rights plan appeared to be reasonable. 96 Indeed,
relying on the advice of its external advisors, the board surmised that
three activist investors were attempting to achieve control of the
company without paying a premium.97 Therefore, the plan’s adoption
was in response to a legitimate threat of “creeping control.”98
Applying the second prong, Vice Chancellor Parsons held there
was adequate probability that the board could demonstrate that
adopting the poison pill was a reasonable reaction to the “wolf pack”
threat. 99 Specifically, when the board implemented the plan, there
93. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *14–15.
94. Id. at *22–23, *27.
95. Id. at *16–17; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955, 957 (Del.
1985).
96. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *17.
97. Id. at *18. Sotheby’s advisors were Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz who enlightened the board as to the breadth of Third Point, Trian, and Marcato’s acquisitions, and
further described a poison pill as an “[e]ffective device to ensure Board involvement in the timing and
outcome of a takeover bid or creeping accumulation of control.” Id. at *9.
98. Id. at *17.
99. Id. at *21.
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was an “objectively reasonable” likelihood that Third Point was
working with other hedge funds to acquire a control block while
avoiding a premium.100 Accordingly, failure to implement a poison
pill or implementing a pill with a trigger greater than 10% would
make such an acquisition relatively easy for a small group of activist
investors; therefore, the pill was a proportionate response to the
threat posed by Third Point.101
b. Refusal to Waive the Trigger
In applying the first prong of the Unocal standard, the court held
that allowing Third Point to acquire more than 10% ownership
presented at least one legally cognizable threat: “negative control.”102
To be sure, if Third Point acquired 20% ownership, it would become
Sotheby’s largest stockholder by far, exercising effective control
without a majority position. 103 The Vice Chancellor specifically
noted that this fact, considered with Mr. Loeb’s “aggressive and
domineering manner . . . in relation to Sotheby’s, provide[d] an
adequate basis for [the board’s] legitimate concern that Third Point
would be able to exercise influence sufficient to control certain
important corporate actions . . . despite a lack of actual control.”104
Coupled with this finding, applying the second prong, the court
quickly decided that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to show a
reasonable probability the board would be unable to demonstrate that

100. Id. at *17.
101. Id. at *15, *17.
102. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21. Negative control refers to the situation where an investor
who cannot obtain a majority share, nonetheless acquires enough stock to obtain a “veto right,” whereby
he can block certain actions that require a substantial vote. Id.
103. Id. at *22. Note too, Sotheby’s board collectively only owns 0.87% of the company’s
outstanding shares. Id. at *3.
104. Id. at *21–22; see also Gardner Davis, Keeping Current: Sotheby’s Poison Pill Battle Reshapes
World of Shareholder Activism, BUS. L. TODAY, June 2014, at 2 (highlighting the importance of
defendant’s successful portrayal of Loeb in an unfavorable light to the outcome of the case because it
was critical to the Vice Chancellor’s acceptance of their “rather tenuous argument that ‘effective
negative control’ was a sufficient threat to justify not waiving the pill”); Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht:
Practical Implications of Sotheby’s Two-Tiered Poison Pill Having Survived Preliminary Judicial
Review in Delaware, M&A UPDATE (Hogan Lovells), June 18, 2014, http://ehoganlovells.com/cv/a1903
d9ea9b819613bc203a0d567c559e4981453 [hereinafter Practical Implications].
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its refusal to waive the 10% cap was a reasonable response to the
threat of negative control.105
2. Proxy Contest Motivation
Vice Chancellor Parsons further concluded that the ensuing proxy
fight was not the board’s primary motive when adopting the plan.106
In addition, though Third Point could suffer irreparable harm from
losing the proxy contest, the poison pill did not tip the scales because
nothing in the plan forced shareholders to vote for incumbent board
members.107 In fact, the Vice Chancellor deduced that the election
was “eminently winnable by either side.”108
3. Structure of the Pill
The Vice Chancellor recognized that Third Point had a valid
concern in the discriminatory nature of the two-tiered poison pill. 109
Nonetheless, he concluded that “the importance of the
‘discriminatory’ nature of the challenged rights plan appear[ed] to be
105. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *22. Vice Chancellor Parsons further stated, “While it is of
course conceivable that there is some level of ownership between 10% and 20% that the Board could
have allowed Third Point to increase its stake . . . without allowing it to obtain negative control, the 10%
cap must be reasonable, not perfect.” Id.
106. Id. at *23–24. The Vice Chancellor reasoned, in part, that obtaining an advantage in the
upcoming proxy contest could not have been the board’s primary motive because Third Point enjoyed a
“10–to–1 advantage over the incumbent Board in shareholdings,” and, as a result, maintained a 50%
chance of winning the upcoming proxy contest, even with the 10% trigger in place. Id. at *23. But see
Memorandum from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Delaware Court of Chancery Finds
Sotheby’s Poison Pill Reasonable; Declines to Enjoin Sotheby’s Annual Meeting (May 5, 2014),
http://www.paulweiss.com/media/2478035/5may14alert.pdf (“Sotheby’s board denied Third Point’s
request because, among other reasons, the waiver would increase Third Point’s chances of winning the
proxy contest and allow them to exercise disproportionate control over major corporate decisions (even
without explicit veto rights).”).
107. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *19 (observing that “the Rights Plan does not impose any
consequences on stockholders for voting their shares as they wish”).
108. Id.
109. Id. at *20. The plaintiffs raised two primary concerns regarding the discriminatory pill: (1)
allowing boards to chill future activist activity will damage passive investors who “depend on activists
to pursue value-enhancing initiatives, including proxy fights, which often serve the long-term interests
of stockholders,” and (2) “stockholders should be treated equally.” Id. at *26. However, despite
acknowledging that the court is “generally sympathetic” to such policy concerns, Vice Chancellor
Parsons refused to consider such repercussions before a final hearing on the merits because “they do not
present imminent threats . . . [but], instead, speak to the long-term reasonableness of the Rights
Plan . . . .” Id.
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overstated . . . .”110 Indeed, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that such a plan’s divergent treatment of activist investors was
inherently wrongful; however, the Vice Chancellor was careful not to
endorse the pill’s two-tier structure.111
C. Implications
1. Two-Tiered Discriminatory Plans
Though the Vice Chancellor deliberately withheld approval of
two-tiered poison pills, his decision certifies that they are not per se
invalid. 112 Moreover, the court’s reasoning conveys that pills
deliberately targeting activist investors are not unreasonable under
the Unocal standard.113 Indeed, such plans may even be a “closer fit”
than “garden variety” plans in the face of a hostile acquisition.114 In
addition, the court noted that a pill having a threshold of more than
10% would have been essentially ineffective.115 As such, poison pills
with lower triggers than traditional rights plans are not just
reasonable but often necessary.116
2. Effective Negative Control
Even where there is no threat of majority acquisition, a board may
be able to successfully defend poison pill implementation based on
the concept of effective negative control. 117 Though Sotheby’s
refusal to grant Third Point a waiver may not have ordinarily held up
under the first prong of the Unocal test,118 considering Mr. Loeb’s
110. Id. at *20.
111. Id. at *26. See Chris O’Leary, Heading Into a Hot Summer, THE M&A LAW., June 2014, at 3
(“[T]he decision isn’t ‘a blanket endorsement of a board’s decision to impose a two-trigger rights plan
that “discriminates” against activists or a board’s decision not to redeem or waive a two-trigger
pill . . . .’”).
112. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
113. See Practical Implications, supra note 104.
114. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20.
115. Id. at *21.
116. See id.
117. See Practical Implications, supra note 104.
118. See id.
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aggressive past conduct, the court concluded that the threat of
negative control was legitimate. 119 Thus, a poison pill may be
reasonable where an investor acquires an influential portion of
company stock and threatens to exercise disproportionate leverage
over major corporate decision-making without paying a premium.120
3. Motivation Matters
Delaware jurisprudence has repeatedly invalidated pills
implemented for the primary purpose of winning a proxy fight or
maintaining boardroom incumbency.121 It is obvious that Sotheby’s
adopted its plan largely in preparation for a proxy contest. 122
Nonetheless, the court concluded the upcoming election was not the
dominant motive behind the pill.123 Therefore, if a board appears to
have concentrated its efforts on preventing a change in control
without paying a premium, it can likely implement a defensive pill
that simultaneously protects members’ incumbency.124
D. What Would Georgia Do?
Like most states, Georgia’s poison pill jurisprudence largely
conforms to Delaware corporate law.125 In fact, Georgia has codified
119. See Davis, supra note 104, at 2.
120. See Practical Implications, supra note 104.
121. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1282 (Del. 1998); Unitrin, Inc.,
v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995) (reiterating “concern about defensive actions
designed to thwart the essence of corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders”).
122. See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *7–9 (Del. Ch.
May 2, 2014) (describing internal communications where board members predicted a shareholder vote
and Third Point’s ambition to infiltrate the board and, further discussed tactics for handling the threat).
123. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
124. Sotheby’s also greatly benefited its position by offering to allow one or two Third Point
representatives onto its board during pre-trial negotiations. Davis, supra note 104, at 2; Third Point,
2014 WL 1922029, at *11–12 (describing the negotiations). However, the brunt of those negotiations
occurred months after the board adopted the pill. Id.
125. In 1988, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held in West PointPepperell v. Farley, Inc. that certain forms of discriminatory poison pills were invalid under the Georgia
code. W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (N.D. Ga. 1988). This decision
made Georgia’s poison pill law inconsistent with Delaware jurisprudence. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN,
supra note 16, at § 5.06 [B][1]. The very next year, however, the legislature rejected West PointPepperell and resolved this inconstancy. See id. at § 5.06 [B][2] (referencing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624’s
1989 amendment).
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Delaware’s validation of discriminatory pills. 126 Nevertheless, in
Invacare, a Georgia federal court veered away from Delaware law
and the Georgia legislature further solidified that divergence with an
amendment to § 14-2-624. 127 However, in doing so, Georgia law
legitimized a poison pill variety that even Delaware’s Court of
Chancery refused to endorse. 128 By upholding continuing director
provisions, Georgia has significantly hindered a discontent
shareholder’s right to settle their grievances through corporate
democracy. 129 Such executive empowerment at the risk of
“disenfranchising shareholders” extends beyond the shield of
Delaware’s business judgment rule. 130 Indeed, there is now a
precedent in Georgia that a board of directors has “sole discretion” in
selecting the terms of a rights plan—a deference that may preempt
fundamental corporate standards.131
Georgia has thus established a poison pill law that is more
amicable to vulnerable boards.132 As such, in applying that law to the
facts of Third Point, a Georgia court would undoubtedly reach the
same conclusion as Vice Chancellor Parsons. Specifically, the court
would likely hold that both the two-tiered pill and waiver refusal
were reasonable reactions to the activist threat and consistent with
126. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014); FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.06 [B][1].
127. See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1997);
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014).
128. Compare Invacare Corp., 968 F. Supp. at 1581 (validating continuing director provisions), with
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1283 (Del. 1998) (striking down delayed
redemption provision), and Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1186 (Del. Ch. 1998) (striking
down dead hand pill).
129. See Harsh, supra note 18, at 685 (“[C]ontinuing director provision[s] may have effectively
eliminated shareholders’ ability to take their grievances to the ballot box . . . [because] shareholders
remain free to vote in a new board, but that new board lacks the power to redeem the rights plan.”);
accord Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision, supra note 1, at 1631 (asserting that “such
provisions effectively render the election of a new board meaningless”).
130. Unitrin, Inc., v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995); see also Velasco, supra note
4, at 397 (discussing the significance of proxy contests in Delaware decisions since Moran).
131. Invacare Corp., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1582. The Invacare court found the board’s “sole discretion”
took “precedence over section 801(b)’s requirement that all limitations on the board’s power be set forth
in the articles of incorporation or the bylaws . . . .” Georgia Upholds Continuing Director Provision,
supra note 1, at 1629. However, the legislature deleted the statute’s “sole discretion” language in 2000
so the text “must be read in a manner consistent with other provisions of the Code.” O.C.G.A. § 14-2624 (2014).
132. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014).
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Georgia law. 133 However, such analysis is likely inconsequential
because the anxious board would have likely adopted a continuing
directors provision if Sotheby’s was incorporated in Georgia,
rendering any proxy contest trivial (at least for 180 days).
III. KEYS TO LOCKING THE BOARDROOM
While poison pills can be useful armaments to a pressured board,
allowing them to gain some leverage against hostile activism and
intercede in a way that serves the best interest of shareholders, poison
pills may impair a business’s growth and serve as an unnecessary
shield for executive incumbency.134 Therefore, while discriminatory
rights plans are legitimate when facilitating a fiduciary duty, recent
corporate law has extended “director primacy”135 too far. Indeed, the
Vice Chancellor’s reasoning in Third Point could make it easier for
incompetent board members to secure their incumbency. 136
Furthermore, Third Point involved the legality of a poison pill
variation that has never before been challenged. 137 Such blatant
discriminatory rights plans contradict grounded principles of
corporate law, raise significant policy concerns, and should never be
validated under judicial review. Therefore, courts, shareholders, and
133. Because of Georgia’s share options statute, the court would not have to apply the Unocal
standard. See generally Invacare Corp., 968 F. Supp. 1578 (no mention of Unocal). Rather, the court
would look to the Georgia Code: section 624(d)(1) authorizes poison pills affecting “beneficial
owner[s]” as defined in section 14-2-1110. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-624(d)(1) (2014), 14-2-1110(4) (2010).
Further, section 624(e)(1) permits “any exclusion from such definition . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(e)(1)
(2014). Therefore, the Code allows flexibility in determining at whom the poison pill is directed. Id.; see
also O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(a) (2014) (empowering the board of directors to choose plan terms including
any “conditions precedent”). So, it appears that a pill treating stockholder classes differently would not
be inconsistent with the statutory language.
134. Francis J. Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Keeping Current: Poison Pills Find New Life as “RaiderLike” Activism is on the Rise, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2014, at 1 (“[P]oison pills [] serve to provide the
target company’s board of directors with the time required to fulfill their fiduciary duties and properly
respond to ‘raider-like’ activists.”).
135. A term coined by Stephen M. Bainbridge in Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers:
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2002). Alexandros Seretakis, Hostile Takeovers
and Defensive Mechanisms in the United Kingdom and the United States: A Case Against the United
States Regime, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 245, 275 (2013).
136. See generally Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2014).
137. See discussion supra Part II.
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state legislatures should take appropriate action to avert Delaware’s
dangerous jurisprudence.
A. A Toxic Precedent
A fundamental pillar of corporate law is a board’s accountability to
its shareholders. This is exemplified in dissident shareholders’
abilities to replace directors whose performance they find
unsatisfactory.138 In fact, the validation of defensive tactics, including
poison pills, was premised on the assumption that shareholders who
are dissatisfied with a board’s decision to block activist offers will
replace those directors with a team willing to take different action.139
Nevertheless, the Third Point decision threatens to entrench
incumbent boards and serve as a blueprint for directors to validate
questionable (perhaps even negligible) decisions.
Corporate law is governed by the precept that shareholders, as
owners of the business, should be entitled to make their own
investment decisions, as well as any decisions concerning the
reallocation of corporate power. 140 As such, when a board of
directors adopts a measure “calculated to alter the structure of the
corporation, removing decisions in takeover matters from individual
stockholders and reposing them in the Board,” it has offended the
very spirit of corporate law.141 Nevertheless, the court in Third Point
found a poison pill reasonable when facing the possibility of negative
or creeping control. 142 This undermines the core competency of
corporate democracy in favor of a governance model that empowers
board members to position themselves as owners of the business.
138. The power to replace board members is the primary check on directorial decision-making.
Indeed, corporate law insulates directors’ judgment from judicial scrutiny on the basis that those
decisions are monitored by shareholders who will hold their directors accountable. See, e.g., In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that “redress for [board]
failures . . . must come . . . through the action of shareholders . . . and not from this Court”).
139. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the stockholders
are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at
their disposal to turn the board out.”).
140. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 195 (3d ed. 1983); infra note 149.
141. Asarco Inc. v. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D.N.J. 1985).
142. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9497-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *17 (Del. Ch. May
2, 2014); see also supra Part II.C.2.
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Because negative and creeping control become “threats” at a very
low percentage of ownership,143 a board can justify adopting a rights
plan against any activist investor. Therefore, directors can deter any
investment they do not approve. Yet, these are not the “raider-like”
activists the poison pill was designed to combat 144 —they are not
primarily concerned with acquiring the company at a price
detrimental to stockholders; rather, they are focused on ensuring that
the company runs in the most profitable manner possible in order to
yield a return on their investments.145
B. The Invalidity of Two-tiered Pills146
Two-tiered rights plans, such as the one utilized in Third Point,
blatantly discriminate against shares of the same class and series.
This is particularly troubling because most states’ corporation laws
forbid, either expressly or implicitly, such discrimination. 147
Although Vice Chancellor Parsons reasoned that the prejudicial
structure of such pills weighs on their long-term reasonableness,148 to
the contrary, such rights plans should be deemed ultra vires.
143. An acquiror could potentially gain a veto right with less than ten percent of the outstanding
stock. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor
Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4–16 (2002) (describing the “historical context of the [antitakeover]
debate”); FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.04 [A] (describing the hostile 1980s activist
environment in which the poison pill was created).
145. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2013); Kuang-Wei Chueh, Is Hedge Fund Activism New Hope for the
Market?, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 724, 729–32 (2008) (describing the role of activist investors in
corporate governance or corporate control).
146. Remember that Vice Chancellor Parsons straddled the fault line of whether such poison pills
were valid, careful not to condone Sotheby’s adopting such a pill. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at
*26–27; see also supra Part II.C.2. Therefore, outside the context of a preliminary injunction,
discriminatory rights plans may still be found invalid, not just in other states, but by the Delaware Court
of Chancery. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *26–27.
147. Velasco, supra note 4, at 403 n.153 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 6.01–.02 (1999)); accord
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-602 (2014) (“[A]ll shares of a class or, if applicable, series within a class must have
preferences, limitations, and relative rights identical with those of other shares of the same class or
series . . . .”). Note, too, that although Delaware’s corporate statutes do not have such an express
provision, this concept has been adopted through the state’s common law. See In re Sea-Land Corp.
S’holder Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 799–800 n.10 (Del. Ch. 1993) (citing cases that demonstrate it has
historically been recognized that “absent an express agreement or statute to the contrary, all shares of
stock are equal”).
148. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20.
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1. An Argument Against Shareholder Discrimination
Most courts that have struck down poison pills have done so on the
basis of discrimination.149 Specifically, because a typical rights plan
allows common shareholders to exercise or transfer a particular right
upon the occurrence of a triggering event while prohibiting the
acquirer from doing the same, those courts have found poison pills
unlawful or unwarranted. 150 Similarly, two-tiered rights plans
discriminatorily dilute an “acquiror’s interests, voting rights, and
equity . . . .” 151 Moreover, two-tiered poison pills base such
discrimination on the type of schedule filed. Therefore, stock from
the exact same class will produce different voting capacity depending
on whether the purchaser filed a schedule 13D (which activist
investors must file) or 13G (which only passive investors may
file).152 For this reason, two-tiered plans brazenly contradict Moran
where the court premised its decision on the notion that poison pills
would only have a “minimal” effect on proxy contests.153
In sum, two-tiered rights plans, when exercised, create a drastic
change in a corporation’s control structure. They reallocate equity
interests and disrupt the voting power among shareholders of the
same class. Restructuring of this magnitude cannot be done without
an amendment to the corporate charter.154 Therefore, two-tier poison
pills exceed the power granted to a board of directors.

149. E.g., W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Farley Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (N.D. Ga. 1988);
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc. 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (flip-in
provision’s discriminatory features violated corporate law); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621
F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding a pill’s non-transferability constraint illegally
discriminated among shareholders).
150. See cases cited supra note 149.
151. Thompson, supra note 20, at 195. Like other poison pills, when a triggering event occurs under a
two-tier plan, the rights of the acquiror become non-exercisable and non-transferable. Id.
152. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015) (setting forth the requirements for filing schedules 13D and
13G).
153. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985).
154. Corporate charters list the rights of shareholders. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a)
(2006).
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2. Policy Concerns
Many academics and capitalists opine that hostile takeovers are an
essential mechanism for safeguarding the efficiency of corporate
governance. 155 Indeed, hedge funds and private equity funds often
pursue control in a company because they have innovative ideas on
how to realize that company’s value. 156 Effectively implementing
those changes, however, often requires the ousting of underperforming directors. Nevertheless, armed with a pill that directly
limits the ownership of such investors, single-minded directors can
obtain considerable leverage and not only frustrate the
implementation of these beneficial changes but also ensure their
incumbency by creating an obvious advantage in a proxy contest or
even deterring a proxy challenge altogether. 157 Moreover, because
two-tiered pills allow passive investors to purchase up to 20% of the
company’s outstanding shares, a shareholder that has filed a schedule
13G can disproportionately affect the company’s future. 158 Indeed,
the Delaware Court of Chancery suggested in Third Point that

155. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 145; Chueh, supra note 144; Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen
Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001).
156. Though a common concern with activist investors is the assumption that they over-emphasize
short-term returns at the expense of long-term growth, this concern is largely exaggerated. Bebchuk,
supra note 145, at 1639. On the contrary, there are ample incentives for activists to pursue strategies that
will benefit both the long and short terms. Id. at 1643. Therefore, even if activists produce some longterm costs, the benefits of those actions may well exceed any deficiencies. Id. at 1664–65. So, this
dichotomy necessarily raises the question of activists’ motivation: are they concerned with private
benefits or earning a return on their investment? If it is the latter, an activist takeover may benefit the
company and yield a financial benefit to shareholders. Chueh, supra note 144, at 754–58.
157. Proxy challenges are extremely expensive. See generally Daniel M. Friedman, Expenses of
Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 951 (1951). Therefore, where an investor’s ownership is
limited, the cost of taking control may become too high in light of the increased risk of losing.
158. In particular, schedule 13G’s passivity requirement is self-proclaimed, and the decision to switch
from schedule 13G to 13D is largely a subjective one; as a consequence, an investor who secretly holds
activist intentions may be able “to improperly file a Schedule 13G while quietly planning (or even
discretely acting on) its activist intentions.” Kristin Giglia, Note, A Little Letter, A Big Difference: An
Empirical Inquiry into Possible Misuse of Schedule 13g/13d Filings, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 105, 117
(2016). Moreover, “nothing in the rules or statute explicitly precludes Schedule 13G filers from
exercising their voice when it comes to voting on corporate matters.” Id. at 118. Indeed, the only formal
restrictions on corporate voting “apply through the ten-day safe-harbor provision, which triggers only
when a 13G filer switches to 13D filing (either by choice or by surpassing the twenty percent
threshold).” Id. at 118 n.74 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(e)-(f) (2015)).
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investors who had filed schedule 13Gs could vote in a proxy contest
without forfeiting their passive status.159
C. Preventing the Transmission of a Toxic Precedent
As discussed in the preceding sections, Third Point, if applied
loosely, could create a precedent that entrenches boards at the
expense of corporate democracy and legitimizes a poison pill that is
beyond the traditional power vested in directors. However, courts,
states, and shareholders can mitigate such negative repercussions,
particularly in states such as Georgia that have become rooted in a
practice of boardroom protectionism.
1. Courts
Though Vice Chancellor Parsons decided Third Point under the
Unocal test, considering the circumstances, he could have utilized the
more exacting Blasius standard. 160 “Blasius held that the board of
directors must provide a ‘compelling justification’ for its actions
where the board act[s] ‘for the primary purpose of interfering with
the effectiveness of a stockholder vote.’”161 Indeed, because adopting
a two-tiered pill will inhibit an acquirer’s voting rights by capping its
ownership of voting shares, Georgia could review such pills under
the Blasius standard. In fact, Blasius may even be more appropriate
considering the discriminatory nature of two-tiered plans, especially
if adopted in anticipation of a proxy contest. Even so, Blasius would
not be dispositive. However, it would place a more exacting burden
159. Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20 n.37 (Del. Ch.
May 2, 2014) (“Based on the evidence presented here, there do not appear to be any restrictions
whatsoever on a Schedule 13G filer who wishes to vote for a dissident slate in a proxy contest. Said
differently, there is no evidence that a Schedule 13G filer would have to file a Schedule 13D or would
otherwise ‘trigger’ the Rights Plan simply because they decide to vote for directors other than those
endorsed by the Company.”).
160. Despite the plaintiffs’ urging, Vice Chancellor Parsons determined that Unocal, not Blasius, was
the proper standard of review. Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *15. However, the Vice Chancellor
was sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ argument in theory and even noted the slight possibility that Blasius
could be implicated within the Unocal framework. Id.
161. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 330 (Del. Ch. 2010) (quoting Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
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on directors to justify their actions, thereby encouraging legitimate
use of defensive measures and safeguarding shareholder franchise.
2. States
An indulgent approach to takeover measures, such as Georgia’s, is
logical:
Because managers have authority over reincorporation
decisions, a state, in order to attract more companies
through reincorporations from other states, or alternatively
prevent a flight of companies to other states, will adopt a
lenient stance towards management takeover rules.
Therefore, states have incentives to provide rules that
shield the management from hostile takeovers.162
Still, states must be careful not to protect corporate management at
the expense of shareholders’ rights.163 Indeed, to avoid overpowering
directors without shareholder approval, states could amend their
statute to require that any rights plan adopted outside the context of
an undervalued tender offer must be approved by a majority of the
company’s shareholders.164 Under this mandate, a board under fire
would still have a prerogative to adopt a poison pill; yet, it would
avoid any conflict of interest and ensure that the choice is in the
owners’ best interest. Therefore, boards would maintain an active
162. Seretakis, supra note 135, at 270–71; see also William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (progressing the author’s “race to the bottom
theory” in which he proposes that Delaware’s appetite for revenues from incorporations has led the state
to establish a lenient corporate law; this subsequently influenced other states that are now competing in
a “race to the bottom”).
163. Professor Eisenberg said, “[c]orporat[ion] law is constitutional law.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1969). Though it may be a slight exaggeration, states should be hesitant to ever defy the core
principles of corporate law.
164. This could also be accomplished through corporate procedures, and, in fact some corporations do
have “precatory (non-binding) resolutions actually voted on to redeem poison pills or to put them to a
stockholder vote.” FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 [C][1]. However, despite an upward
trend in these voting resolutions late in the Twentieth Century, they have “diminished rapidly” in more
recent years “with only 6 resolutions voted on in 2008 (3 passed), 8 in 2009 (5 passed), [and] 5 in 2010
(2 passed).” Id.
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role in corporate defense while preserving corporate democracy.
Furthermore, requiring shareholders’ approval would clarify the
judicial review of poison pills. Notably, activist investors could no
longer attempt to enjoin a poison pill by asserting that the board’s
primary purpose in its adoption was to gain unnecessary leverage or
ensure incumbency.
Of course, the business judgment rule would still be applicable. As
a preliminary matter, the court would review the board’s
recommendation to adopt the pill under Unocal. Also, assuming the
pill does not have an automatic expiration, courts could conclude that
a board of directors breached its fiduciary duty by not redeeming the
plan in an appropriate timeframe.
3. Shareholders
Regardless of state law and common law jurisprudence, the most
significant check on poison pill implementation remains the
shareholders themselves. Indeed, equity owners are the pulse of
corporations and thereby have the capacity to direct corporate policy
and hold management accountable through their right to vote.165
“A basic incident of stock ownership is the right to make decisions
about who is to control the corporation, and whether to sell shares to
a person seeking to acquire control of the company.”166 By and large,
any change in management will also mean a change in direction.
Transforming corporate practice should not be taken lightly;
therefore, an imperative duty of major stockholders is to stay
informed. Especially in the context of a rights pill adoption and
upcoming proxy contest, owners should carefully consider the
financial condition of the company, current managers’ attitudes and
past behavior, the challenger’s proposals, the potential of long-term

165. Through the voting process “shareholders elect and remove directors, amend articles of
incorporation, and approve matters like mergers and consolidations, sale of substantially all assets, and
dissolutions.” Jonathan Shub, Shareholder Rights Plans—Do They Render Shareholders Defenseless
Against Their Own Management?, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 991, 1034 (1987).
166. Id.
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costs versus the value of interim returns, and the opinion of any
proxy advisory services.167
Additionally, in states such as Georgia where continuing director
provisions have been validated, dissident shareholders could amend
corporate bylaws that prohibit management’s use of dead hand pills
or even poison pills all together.168 Although, Invacare invalidated a
hostile bidder’s proposed bylaw that would have dismantled the
target’s poison pill defense, the court’s reasoning would not likely
carry over to a bylaw proposed by investors outside the framework of
a takeover attempt. However, if the decision was read so broadly as
to hold all such mandatory bylaw amendments invalid under Georgia
law, the necessity for the state’s legislature to take action in
preserving the integrity of corporate law cannot be overemphasized.
CONCLUSION
Despite the precarious nature of poison pills, the United States
boasts one of the most successful economies in the world—a position
it has achieved without allowing investors to acquire companies
unqualifiedly. Indeed, the U.S. market will never bow to the potential
dangers of unchallenged takeover bids, nor should it. Accordingly,
poison pills are an enduring stamp on corporate America; yet, they
should never be able to swallow the cornerstones of corporate law.
The Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Third Point, however,
threatens to do just that if applied too broadly. Therefore, it is time to
deviate from director primacy and place the power to alter corporate
structure back in the hands of shareholders. Such reform is crucial to
the preservation of corporate constitutionalism, especially in states
like Georgia where managerial favoritism runs rampant.

167. Perhaps most notable, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS) examines poison pills under
a formal rubric to ultimately recommend voting “Against” or “Withhold” in an election. INSTITUTIONAL
S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., 2013 SRI U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (2013); see also FLEISCHER &
SUSSMAN, supra note 16, at § 5.02 [C][1] (listing the factors considered in ISS’s review).
168. Remember, according to Georgia law, dead hand provisions can only remain non-redeemable for
180 days. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624 (2014). Thus, the preceding voting discussion is still effective and
perhaps even more important in Georgia.
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